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Abstract
In this paper, the author explores the reasons why some
states have achieved higher levels of progress in transitioning
from a communist system to a system rooted in democratic
capitalism. Unlike the majority of scholars, though, he does
not fault any one government's policies or the reform path
chosen for a country's success or supposed failure along the
way. Instead, the author concludes that the outcome of the
transition process is dependent upon the interaction between
the new formal institutions being adopted and the prevailing
informal societal institutions and rules found throughout
the region. If the formal institutions are in harmony with the
informal institutions, then transition should occur relatively
smoothly. Transaction costs will be lower, and individuals
will be encouraged to engage in economic activity, producing
wealth.
Using a panel growth regression and a data sample drawn
from 20 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe
over the period 1990-2005, the author empirically tests
the validity of this hypothesis. In order to measure whether
the interaction between the new formal institutions and the
informal institutions has a significant impact on economic
growth in each sample country, he incorporates each state's
score for overall economic freedom from the Heritage
Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic Freedom, as well as
its score for political rights and civil liberties from Freedom
House. The more in tune a country's informal rules are with
the formal rules being adopted- those of a market economy
and pluralistic system of government- the better the scores it
is awarded from each organi::.ation.
The results provide evidence in support of the author's
hypothesis. Even though the impact of political rights and civil
liberties is inconclusive, the regression estimation does show
that the level of economic freedom enjoyed by the citizens of a
country does significantly affect levels of GDP, meaning that
greater levels of success along the path towards democracy
and a market-based economy in Central and Eastern Europe
can be attributed to each country's informal institutions. The
more these are in tune with the fomzal rules being adopted,
the quicker citi::.ens in a country are able to adapt to the new
institutions, allowing for a democratic, capitalist system to take
root and flourish.
I. Introduction
The end of Communism in Central and Eastern
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Europe was a watershed event of the late 20th century. The
authoritarian regimes of the region had succumbed to domestic
pressures and relinquished their monopoly on power, and
nearly overnight approximately 300 million Europeans were
presented with the opportunity to choose their political and
economic systems anew. Where should they begin? What
was important? Where should they look for guidance and
assistance? The citizens of each country had to answer these
simple, yet crucial questions. In response, academics of all
disciplines and convictions, governments, and international
organizations attempted to provide guidance and advice on the
steps of the reform process.
II. Success in the Transition Process- The Interaction Thesis
A small group of economists comprised mainly of Enrico
Colombatto, Jan Svejnar, Jan Winiecki, and Svetozar Pejovich,
attributes the success of the transition process to whether or
not the new market system, with its new and different rules and
values, is adaptable to the culture and history of the country in
question. As Svetozar Pejovich (2003) states:

Transition means institutional restructuring. Since formal
rules are not a policy variable, transition has to mean
the enactment of new formal rules: that is, constitutions,
statutes, common law precedents, and/or governmental
regulations. The results of transition then depend on the
interaction of new formal and prevailing informal rules.
Of course, the rules do not interact. Individuals do. New
formal rules create new incentives and opportunities for
human interactions. How individuals react to those new
opportunities for exchange depends on how they perceive
them. And how individuals perceive new opportunities
depend on the prevailing culture.
In other words. the issue on which the success of the
transition process actually hinges is not the technical aspects
of reform or the numerous policies, but rather the transactions
costs created by these reforms. costs which are defined as the
cost incurred by an individual when engaging in economic
activity. Transaction costs are indirectly related to the
compatibility of these transition policies and the new market
system with the history of the numerous populations in Central
and Eastern Europe and the customs, traditions, and culture
that grew out of this history. If the new formal institutions
are in tune with the informal institutions, then the transition
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should occur relatively smoothly because the transaction
costs of conducting business are low and individuals will find
it worthwhile to engage in economic activity and produce
wealth. If the new formal institutions are not in tune with the
informal institutions, then individuals will find that transactions
costs are higher than before, which discourages them from
conducting business and producing wealth. Therefore the
question needing to be answered is whether the formal
institutions being developed by the transition process and the
values and behavior necessary for the proper functioning of
these formal institutions agree with the informal institutions
already in place in these countries (Colombatto and Macey
1999, Pejovich 1997,2001,2003 and Winiecki 2000, 2004).

A. The Interaction Thesis
Svetozar Pejovich ( 1997) terms this phenomenon the
interaction thesis, which states that, if the formal institutions
are compatible with the informal institutions, then the
incentives they create will tend to reinforce one another. As
Pejovich (2003) later summarizes:
When changes in formal rules are in harmony with the
prevailing informal rules, the incentives they create will
tend to reduce transaction costs and free some resources
for the production of wealth. When new formal rules
conflict with the prevailing informal rules, the incentive
they create will raise transaction costs and reduce the
production of wealth in the community.
The interaction thesis describes the scenario that had been
unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe for years. Following
the events of 1989 and 1990, the new governments in this
region undertook the process of building capitalism. with the
guidance and strong support from the West. Almost overnight
the formal institutions that had been in place during the
communist era had been deemed obsolete. In their place a new
set of rules and institutions based on those found in Western
societies was installed. forming the new framework by which
the people in the region would conduct business and interact
amongst themselves and with the rest of the world.

B. Outcomes of the Transition Process if the F omzal &
Informal Institutions are Incompatible
As Colombatto (200 l. 284) points out. ·· ... in the modem
world. freedom is a secondary need. Security comes first." In
the case of Central and Eastern Europe. such circumstances
created the opportunity for the new system to be hijacked
and run aground by those who wanted to use the political
machinery for personal gain. This allowed members of the
former nomenklatura and other rent-seekers to gain control
of the new economic system and led to the development of a
large informal economy or black market in some countries.
Even though the emergence of practices such as the oli~rarchs
in Russia or a similar business class in the Ukraine did little
to promote the public welfare or the success of the transition
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process, the majority of society did not protest against such
behavior because it provided a sense of security, which arose
from being able to engage in transactions much in the same
manner as they had for the past decades and even centuries.
These transactions were not based on the type of trust that
permitted the creation of an extended order in society, which
was needed if the new formal rules were to produce the desired
outcome. Instead, these economic transactions were based
on one's reputation and the personal relationships found in
the close-knit communities of Central and Eastern Europe
(Colombatto 2001 and Pejovich 1997, 2003).
The conflict between the new formal institutions and
the region's informal institutions also led to the election of
leaders who were able to undermine the reform process. Such
leaders played on the fears of the populace, promising to
provide security at a time when no one was certain as to the
course economic and political reform would take. They were
subsequently elected, but instead of promoting the aims of the
transition process, these leaders sabotaged the entire process,
effectively securing a monopoly on power for themselves and
in doing so taking the newly-won political and civil freedoms
away from the people. Vladimir Putin in Russia and Aleksandr
Lukashenka are two examples of such leaders. This process
was able to occur because only in a stable society, where
people feel secure, can the exercise of freedom or personal
economic interests become relevant. Until such a point has
been reached, though, the desire for order and comfort takes
precedence over any desire for freedom (Colombatto 200 I and
Woodruff 2005).

C. The Interaction Thesis and Central and Eastern
Europe -A Summary
The success of the transition process is not dependent on
the technical steps taken during the reform process, rather on
the interaction between the new formal institutions that are
being transplanted and the informal institutions already present
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While certain
steps must be taken if the transition process is to result in a
market-based economy and a state that is democratic in nature
and upholds the rule of law, these steps have only a marginal
impact on the eventual outcome of the reform process. They
are merely steps in the reform process, necessary in that
they are required to complete the transition from a socialist
economy to a capitalistic one. However, these steps can take
varying forms and the end result will still be the same. For
example, one can look at the process of transforming an
economy as similar to remodeling a house. Someone can desire
to remodel the house and transform it from its original state for
various reasons, and through this process. the house can gain
an additional pair of new rooms or the house can be altered so
that it receives a different outward appearance. Such changes
are usually carried out for aesthetic, not practical reasons.
Either the owner had grown tired of the outward appearance of
the house or he believed that an addition was needed in order
to allow for more occupants, etc. These changes are aesthetic,
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in that the foundation of the house has not been altered; only
its outward appearance has evolved.
It is much like the process of a newly-elected government
coming to power in Western Europe or the United States.
The new government does not typically alter the political
or economic institutions of the country; these institutions
remain in place. but this does not necessarily mean that
the government retains all of the policies of the previous
government. It is allowed to pass laws and implement policy
as it sees fit, according to its party doctrine and the promises
supposedly made over the course of the campaign. The process
of changing power within a system of government possesses
many similarities with the process of remodeling a house
after a new owner moves in. In both instances, the foundation
of both the house and the system remains the same, only the
appearance changes, in order to incorporate the preferences
or policies of the new government or in this example, the
preferences of the new owner. Such a process occurs regularly
in Western societies. Power is exchanged peacefully within
a system of government. and with this exchange of power,
policies that have varying aims are implemented. but this does
not mean that the foundation which the entire system is built
upon has been altered. These governments must work within
the institutional foundation of each country, a foundation that
in the case of a \Vestern society means the procurement of civil
liberties as well as the property rights system and legal system
necessary for a market economy. For each country that adheres
to such a system, the content and aims of its policies may differ
due to the preferences of its populace, but the foundation on
which the entire system rests remains unaltered.
There are instances. though. that require one to rebuild
the foundation of the house. not for aesthetic purposes, but
in order to ensure that the structure will continue to remain
in existence. This could be due to various reasons: erosion. a
crack in the foundation, etc. In these circumstances, one would
be required to either repair the foundation of the house to a
large extent or rebuild the foundation in its entirety. Following
the events of 1989 and 1990. the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe found themselves in such a situation. No
longer would it prove adequate to simply change the exterior
of its house or in this case. the policies and regulations of the
state. The people demanded a change in the foundation of each
country. No longer could the leaders of each country attempt
to simply alter the communist system and simply improve the
political environment and increase economic growth. Instead.
the citizens of each country pushed for the foundation on
which the state stood to be rebuilt. They insisted upon the right
to political participation. a guarantee of civil liberties. and the
right to make economic decisions based on their preferences.
not those dictated to them from the Communist party and
its apparatus. They demanded to live under a political and
economic system similar to the system found in the Western
world, but in order for such a system to be successfully
transplanted the new formal rules would have to be in tune
with the informal rules that were already present throughout
Published
by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2008
the region.
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Such a transition demanded more than simple adherence
to a certain transition model or reform plan; it required the
people of each country to be in a position to adapt to the new
formal rules that were being exogenously "forced" upon
them. The technical elements of the reform process did not
determine the ultimate outcome; rather they served simply as
a means to an end. Ultimately, the success of the transition
process in each country depended upon whether the populace
was able to adapt to the new formal institutions. If these new
formal rules were successfully adopted then the foundation of
the new market system would be able to stand tirm, allowing
for stable economic growth. If not successfully adopted, then
the results would be different- economic growth would be
volatile and the size of the informal economy would tend
to increase as citizens began conducting business based on
reputation and personal relationships. forgoing the voluntary
exchanges with strangers that allow a capitalistic economy to
operate optimally. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe,
such results would derail the transition process as the people in
each country reverted to methods of conducting economic and
political affairs that might provide comfort and security, but
were not compatible with the methods of a society supportive
of a thriving market economy.

III. Support for the Interaction Thesis
The successful transition from a communist system
to a democratic government and an economy based on the
market was dependent upon the interaction between the new
formal rules being adopted and the informal ones already in
place in each country throughout Central and Eastern Europe
(Colombatto and Macey 1999; Pejovich 1997,2001,2003:
Winiecki 2000, 2004: and Zweynert and Goldschmidt 2006).
Hayek ( 1988) maintains that exposure to the West and its
notion of an extended order encourages the development of
the individual and promotes the self-serving decision-making
process that underlies a capitalist system. According to the
interaction argument. countries with this exposure were
able to put in place a system of credible and secure property
rights with its supporting institutions of a constitution, an
independent judiciary. and freedom of contracts. This historical
connection allowed the new market economy to take root
quickly and begin to thrive within a relatively short time period
as the population of these countries felt comfortable to engage
in voluntary exchanges in the marketplace. fueling economic
growth. On the other hand. countries lacking prior contact with
the West and its traditions and practices had a more difficult
time adopting the formal institutions necessary for a properly
functioning market economy. In these cases. the transition to
a capitalistic economy was derailed at an early stage. allowing
for either strong-armed rulers or rent-seekers to stall both the
economic and political transition process in these countries.
A. Econometric Specifications
The empirical methodology used in this thesis is based
on the estimation of growth regressions using panel data. The
3
data sample covers the period 1990 - 2005 and includes the
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following group of 20 transition countries: Albania, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and
Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Ukraine.
Each of these countries is geographically located in Central,
Eastern. or Southeastern Europe, and began the transition from
a socialist economy to a market-based system in the early
1990s.
This sample utilized panel data, instead of time-series
data. Unlike time-series data, panel data expand the size of
the data sample by including more than one country, thus
increasing the explanatory power of the regression. In doing
so, the data sample increases substantially and the estimation
results are therefore better able to explain the causes of the
economic growth experienced by each country in the region.
In working with the data sample, the author also used fixed
effects techniques instead of random effects, allowing for the
control of certain effects that remain constant over the chosen
time period. By using random effects, it would have meant
that there exist events or circumstances which cannot be
controlled for and could therefore have a substantial impact on
the economic growth of each country. The possibility that such
events or circumstances could occur would alter the coefficient
estimations and significantly decrease the explanatory power of
the growth regression, and in tum damage the credibility of the
empirical study. However. the author maintains that this is not
the case for this data set, and thus utilizes fixed effects.
For this study, five-year running averages were used,
instead of simple five year blocks. By incorporating five-year
running averages into the estimations. the explanatory power
of the growth regression is enhanced in two ways. First,
five-year running averages, which cover time periods 1990199-+, 1991-1995. 1992-1996, etc .• enable an increase in the
explanatory power of the regression estimation by maximizing
the number of observations. With five-year running averages,
it is possible to include 15 five-year blocks. instead of three,
which would be the case if the chosen time period were divided
into three blocks. Second. averaging the data over five-year
increments helps to eliminate the effects of short-run business
cycle dynamics on growth. Failure to eliminate the effects
of such short-run dynamics tends to lead to highly correlated
time series and to gross overestimation of coefficients (!radian
2007).
Following the example of I radian (2007). Fidrmuc (2003 ),
and Berg et al. ( 1999), the author uses the following growth
regression model, hereafter called equation I. to construct the
econometric specifications:
(1)

where git• the dependent variable. is the GOP growth rate
in country i during the time period t. Cis composed of a set
of control variables that are often used in growth literature,
including the level of development as proxied by initial GOP
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per capita, inflation, the annual population growth rate, the
total amount of government expenditure, school enrollment
numbers, total investment, and a measurement of trade
openness. X is the vector of explanatory variables the author
wishes to test. These are the variables (including level of
economic freedom, level of political rights, and level of civil
liberty) the author uses to test the validity of the interaction
thesis, and Eit is the specification error term.

B. Explanation of Variables and Data Sources
The empirical analysis uses data from a sample of 20
countries during the period 1990-2005. Values of annual
population growth rate, real GOP per capita, annual GOP
growth rate, secondary school enrollment rates, levels
of investment, inflation, trade openness, and the share of
government expenditures in GDP are taken from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators (2007). The values for
overall economic freedom in each country are extracted from
the Heritage Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic Freedom,
and the scores regarding the level of political rights and civil
liberty for each country are from the Freedom House (2008).
The first group of variables is a basic set of explanatory
variables commonly used in growth regression analysis. They
are used to control for some core components that usually
drive economic growth in a country. Real GDP per capita is
used to control for prior levels of development. For example,
in this analysis, each five-year running average includes the
beginning year's real GDP per capita level. If the five-year
average corresponds to the period 1990 - 1994, then the real
GDP per capita level from 1990 is used in order to see how the
level of economic development in 1990 affected GDP growth
over that five year period. Annual population growth rates
take into account the size of the labor pool in each country.
The secondary school enrollment rate measures the number
of people in each country receiving a basic level of education
and thus is a rough estimate regarding the skill level of the
country's workforce, while the variable measuring the total
amount of government expenditure represents the extent to
which a state's fiscal policy aids or harms its economy.
By incorporating inflation into the regression, the author
is controlling for overall levels of macroeconomic stability in
each of the countries being tested. The level of investment is
measured by the amount of capital available in each country
and is used to show the amount of capital or funds earmarked
for economic investment. Also included in this group of
control variables is a measure of trade openness, since the
level of openness in an economy can greatly affect the levels
of economic growth experienced by that country (Arora and
Vamvakidis 2004, and Kali et al. 2007). Trade openness is
calculated as the total value of imports plus exports over
total GOP (I+EIGDP). The final variable included in each
five-year running average is the initial level of GOP growth.
Even though GOP growth serves as the dependent variable,
preceding levels of GOP growth are believed to directly affect
later levels of economic growth. Thus, for each five-year
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running average, the average GOP growth for the previous
five-year running average was included.
The second group of variables, including economic
freedom, political rights, and civil liberties, comprises the
vector of explanatory variables the author wishes to test. These
three variables have been chosen in order to test the validity of
the interaction thesis. By incorporating these three variables
into the regression specification, the author is able to observe
how the process of democratization influences levels of GOP
in the region. More importantly, he can also see whether the
compatibility or incompatibility of the new formal institutions
and the informal institutions in each country significantly
affects and leads to economic growth. The first explanatory
variable, economic freedom, is included in order to observe
how the interaction between formal and informal institutions
in each country affects economic growth over the chosen
period. As mentioned earlier, the values for this variable are
taken from the Heritage Foundation's 2006 Index of Economic
Freedom and are equal to the overall score for economic
freedom of each country over the period 1990-2005. For
each country considered, a score is given on a scale of 1 to 5,
with lower scores translating into higher levels of economic
freedom.
Due to its ability to measure the level of government
participation in the economy, the author chose to incorporate
the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom into
the growth regression as a measure of how well a state has
progressed along the path towards a market-based economy.
The notion behind this decision is that the lower the score
a state receives, the better that country has performed in
its transition to a market-based economy. The new formal
institutions and rules of a capitalistic economy are in tune
with the informal institutions already present in that country,
thus, the new system has been successfully adopted by the
citizens of that country. Now the question to be answered
is whether the adoption of a market-based system leads to
economic growth, and if so then to what extent. By including
this measure of economic freedom as a variable in the growth
regression, the author desires to answer this question, and see
if there exists empirical support for the interaction thesis.
The final two variables included are political rights and
civil liberties, and they are meant to measure the effect of
democratization on economic growth in the region. Each of
the values for these variables is extracted from the Freedom
House's annual publication that measures the level of political
freedom, which it defines as "opportunity to act spontaneously
in a variety of fields outside the control of government and
other centers of potential domination"' (Freedom House 2008),
enjoyed by the citizens of each state throughout the world.
The organization states that it·· ... does not maintain a culturebound view of freedom. The methodology of the survey
is grounded in basic standards of political rights and civil
liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Freedom House
2008).
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These two measures of political freedom were included
in order to determine whether the democratization process
occurring in conjunction with the economic transformation
throughout the region impacts economic growth. Did the
transition to a democratic system of government affect the
standard of living in Central and Eastern Europe? Or did the
process of political liberalization have little effect on the lives
of individuals in these countries. except that citizens are now
empowered to choose their own leaders and are better able
to hold those elected accountable for their actions once in
power, and to do so without fear of punishment if one's views
digressed from that of the state apparatus? Inclusion of the
two measures of political freedom in the growth regression
provided a mechanism for answering these types of questions.

C. Empirical Estimation Results
As mentioned earlier, the author utilizes five-year
running averages when conducting fixed effects estimations
of equation. In order to check for robustness, three different
specifications are run. Each includes the basic set of control
variables represented by C in the equation, the difference
among the three specifications being the inclusion of one
of the three explanatory variables from vector X. The first
specification includes only the variable measuring civil
liberties; the second specification incorporates only the
value that quantifies the level of political rights; and the
final specification includes only the variable representing
economic freedom. A specification incorporating all three
of the explanatory variables the author wished to test is not
possible due to the high levels of correlation existing between
the variables. Thus, the author is only able to examine each of
these variables individually. Additionally, the results presented
here have been corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's
correction method.
Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation (I) for
each specification. Column 1 presents the estimation results
for the first specification, which measures the impact of civil
liberties on economic growth. The results for the second
specification, which includes the political rights variable, are
shown in column 2. and column 3 shows the results for the
third and final specification, which calculates the effect of
economic freedom on economic growth for the 20 transition
countries included in study. In addition, located at the bottom
of each column is the number of observations and the adjusted
R-squared for the corresponding specification.
The results of the three specifications provide an
interesting picture regarding the effects of democratization and
economic liberalization on economic growth in the transition
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As one can see,
the first two specifications generate similar values for the
coefficients of each control variable. For each of the control
variables. the impact on the GOP growth rate in each country
is as expected. The initial levels of GDP growth significantly
affect later levels of economic growth in a positive manner,
meaning that the higher the level of economic growth at
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In the third specification, the estimated coefficients of the
control variables do not alter significantly and the Adjusted
R-squared increases only slightly from 0.936754 and 0.937094
to 0.964658, respectively. The only noticeable difference
among the group of control variables is the finding that the
Table l. Dependent Variable: <iDP Growth Rate for each Country
total amount of government expenditures becomes significant
at the 5 percent level. However, the estimated coefficient for
S~ification 2
Seedtication 3
'rar\O)b1e
S~ification 1
Economic Freedom
Political Rights and
<:i1-·il Liberties and
economic freedom is significant at the 5 percent level. This
and Gru"lo\oth
(;rov.th
Gro\'\tb
O.S..J8847*
0.551645*
0.5-UH39"'
llnttial GDP Uro\\th
means that, in contrast to the level of civil liberties or political
(!3.44h97)
( 16.03929)
(l:;..:'it07>H
1.253509**
-2.-U1126*
-2.810426*
-2-l-07336*
GDP pn capita
rights, the amount of economic freedom enjoyed by the citizens
(-2.()..l.5954)
1-".7977';9)
1 (-::!.90.)...1.03)
Tradeof a country does impact economic growth, and as estimated
1.567780*
2.011660*
t)pcnne~s
(2.986::41)
(4.105607)
f:ZS'ShS.-1.1
by the regression specification it possesses an overall positive
(Jl)n•mment
..
-0.1 ...
3866
0.063396
0.023469
(-2.513881)
(1).845368)
10.338747)
E-..[k'ndtture
effect on GDP. In other words, if a country increases its overall
8.253516*
7.817959*
7.756691*
(10.20491)
17.8-'-6--1.' 9)
0.435501)
score for economic freedom by one point, for example from
-0.002205*
-0.006991*
-0.002-+tb*
l lnllalmn
( -3.0895-M)
(-6.624-1-98)
!-3AIJ795J
3.2 to 2.2, then that country should see its overall economic
~
0.200332
0.213668
~0.079532
1 r~)plllat~nn Gmv.th
(0.441684)
output increase by more than 2 percent. Such a result shows
10.41077-H
·0.576(}8-t
\ Cn il L1bcny
not only that greater levels of economic freedom lead to higher
i-1.18H-l99l
0.291137
!' Po!tw:al R1ght\
rates of GDP growth, but in doing so it also provides evidence
(0.857902)
i E.:onomic Freedom
in
support of the interaction thesis, since the higher the score
I
(·"'.37-l831)
!52
!52
108
a country receives from the Heritage Foundation for overall
1 Ad . R--.quarl·d
0.9JfJ75-t
0.937094
0.964658
economic freedom, the greater that country's economy operates
Not~s: The symbols * and ** mean that the estimated coefficients are
according to market principles. Therefore, one can conclude
significantly different than zero at the I and 5 percent confidence level,
that the culture and history, as well as the societal makeup of a
respectively: !·statistics are in parentheses.
country, do matter in determining the rate at which a system of
democratic capitalism is adopted. The more in tune a people's
stability, which is measured by inflation, is necessary in
culture and their corresponding informal rules are with the new
achieving economic growth. GDP per capita, as expected,
formal institutions, the greater the level of economic growth a
possesses a negative effect on economic growth, meaning that
country can expect to experience.
higher levels of initial GDP or economic development tend to
slow economic expansion.
D. Implications of the Growth Regression Results for the
Population growth proves to be insignificant in
Transition Process in Central and Eastern Europe
determining levels of output, but this phenomenon could
Based on the results of the panel growth regression
arguably be attributed to the fact that the population levels in
described in the previous sections, two points warrant further
each of these countries did not significantly increase in the
discussion. First, it was estimated that two factors, civil
period 1990-2005. In the first two specifications, overall
liberties and political rights, did not significantly increase
economic growth is not significantly affected by the total
economic growth for the region of Central and Eastern Europe
amount of government expenditure in each country, and the
from 1990 through 2005. Proponents of the Chinese model
etlects of school enrollment levels on GDP growth cannot
or the pluralistic market socialist transition model could
be included in either of the specifications due to the lack of
utilize these results to support their argument that the former
observations available.
Communist countries in Europe should not have introduced
In both of these specifications, the level of civil liberties
reforms to transform the state politically. especially as these
or political rights enjoyed by citizens of a country in the region countries were transitioning from an economy run by the
proves to be insignificant in determining economic growth.
Communist party to one where the market was permitted
although the coefficients for these two variables possess
to dictate the amount and types of goods to be produced.
different values. According to results for the first specification.
According to them, it would have been more prudent to follow
higher levels of civil liberties lead to greater economic growth,
a path of transition similar to that of China and other Asian
while greater political rights adversely affect economic output.
countries or to implement an economic reform plan similar to
However. despite this seemingly puzzling outcome. any further the ''reform socialism" pushed by the Communist governments
analysis of these two variables is irrelevant for two reasons.
in Europe at various times following World War II. the most
First. the estimated coefficients for both of these variables do
notable examples being Gorbachev's policies of perestroika
not prove to be significant at either the I or 5 percent level,
and glasnost. In both of these scenarios. a single political
and for the purposes of this thesis the question as to whether
party or entity maintains a tight control over judicial affairs
the process of democratization significantly impacts economic
while supposedly liberalizing the economy in phases over an
grm>th has been answered. Neither the level of civil liberties
extended pe1iod of time.
nor the level of political rights in each country appears to have
However. in light of this critique regarding the transition
influenced economic growth during the period 1990-2005.
process occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. the author 6
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the beginning of the five-year average, the higher the levels
of growth a country experiences over that five year period.
Trade openness leads to increases in GDP as does the level of
investment in each country. As one can see, macroeconomic
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reiterates that such arguments are irrelevant and even erroneous
for two distinct reasons. In both of the cases mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, complete economic liberalization
is usually not the main goal of the government in power. It
is only lip-service to the outside world. The commanding
heights of the economy remain in the hands of those holding
political power, and the individual is still only allowed a
limited role in determining economic outcomes in a market
that remains handicapped by the self-interests and overbearing
presence of the state or those in power. In other words, the
reforms implemented only go so far. The entire economic
system will never be transformed completely, because such a
transition would undermine the interests of the political party
or individuals who possess complete control over the political
machinery within the country.
In addition, proponents of this and similar views fail
to take into account the circumstances and sentiments
surrounding the events of 1989 and 1990 in the Eastern bloc.
According to the regression results, one can state that civil
liberties and political rights did not significantly impact
economic growth during the first 15 years of transition,
yet from the same results one can also infer that these two
variables did not adversely affect economic growth either
(Fidrmuc 2003). The people living in the Eastern bloc desired
both a standard of living similar to that of their neighbors in the
West as well as a system of government in which they could
elect their leaders and openly hold views that differed from
those of the state. If the Communist party was to relinquish
its control over the commanding heights of the economy.
then it also would have to give up the reins of political power
since the two systems were tightly intermeshed. The term
'·centrally-planned economy'" did not simply describe the
method by which the economy was managed, because the
economy was an inseparable part of an authoritarian state
where the party. governmental, and economic hierarchies
were tightly intermeshed. with the party and its apparatus
possessing the dominant voice among the three entities.
Reforn1s were therefore inevitably blocked at the point where
any further change in the system of economic management
might undermine the interests of the party (Kozul-Wright and
Rayment 1997). Hence. economic reform could not occur
without political reform and vice-versa; the two processes of
reform had to occur simultaneously if either one of them was
to prove successful.
The second point worth additional commentary is the role
a people and their informal institutions and rules played and
continue to play in determining the outcome of the transition
process in Central and Eastern Europe. The growth regression
results show that a county's level of economic freedom has
a significant impact on economic growth. Despite this result.
though, many economists would agree with Aslund (2002. 75)
when he states that a country's culture. history, and religion
had only minimal impact on economic growth in Central and
Eastern Europe from 1990-2005. especially in comparison to a
country's economic policy, geography. and levels of investment
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and technology. However, th1s author strongly disagrees. It
is true that current levels of development. investment and
education, as well as previous levels of GDP. have a large
effect on future rates of growth. However, in order to maintain
satisfactory levels of investment and economic development,
a country has to be able to create an environment that
encourages mdividuals- fore1gn or domestic -to mvest in its
economy and engage in activity within its borders that creates
wealth and leads to economic growth. If such an environment
requ1res certain rules and standards that most politicians and
economists agree are necessary for mvestment and economic
growth, then why do some countries still lag behind in the
transition process? Why are some transition countries unable
to effectively implement these rules and standards, while
other states have been able to do so and are now experiencing
impressive levels of economic expansion?
As discussed by Friedrich von Hayek ( 1988) and others,
certain cultures and societal orders are more conducive to
a market-based economy and a political order rooted in
the notions of democracy and individual liberties. These
societies promote self-interest. self-responsibility, and selfdetermination; values that reinforce the formal institutions
-secure property rights. a constitution. an independent
judiciary, and freedom of contracts- underlying a capitalistic
system (Colombatto and Macey 1997. Hayek ! 988, and
Pejovich 1995, 1997, 2003). If a people have had previous
contact with a societal order that nurtures those or similar
values. then they will be more inclined to successfully adopt
a system of government and economics that are based in
these formal institutions and rules. As a result. transaction
costs will be minimaL and individuals will be encouraged to
engage in economic activity, which in turn creates economic
output and wealth. If not, transaction costs are high, leading
to situations in which people do not trust the new system and
revert to what is considered "comfortable" or secure. Special
interest groups gain control of the political and economic
system and encourage rent-seeking actions and other behavior
that undermines the transition process. As a result, the new
system does not take root and a political and economic
doldrums emerges. Such is the case in Central and Eastern
Europe. Countries having prior contact and interaction with
the West and its values have arguably faired better in the
transition process. while countries lacking such contact have
not achieved the same levels of progress as some of their
neighbors.

V. Conclusions
The events of 1989 and 1990 opened a new chapter for
Central and Eastern Europe. Almost overnight. Communism
and its ideals lost favor throughout the region. causing
communist parties to relinquish their control over society
and a power vacuum to emerge. Elections were held shortly
thereafter. and although there were varying opinions as to the
new direction each state should take. the majority of citizens
throughout the region desired a government modeled on the
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As evidenced by the improved scores for overall levels of
democratic values of the West and an economic system based
economic freedom awarded by the Heritage Foundation, it
on the markets, allowing individuals to make consumption
is possibly only a matter of time before certain states catch
decisions based on their preferences and for goods to be
up with their neighbors in adopting the institutions and rules
allocated according to the law of supply and demand. These
necessary for a properly functioning market economy and
preferences represented a clear break from the past. No longer
a political order rooted in the principles of democracy and
would the individual be forced to look to the state for guidance
pluralism.
in every aspect of one's life. Instead, the people would be able
to control the political and economic destiny of their countries.
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Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2008

15

but Brian Lee did the yeoman's dogged work to organi::.e,
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